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additionally that they anticipated future
advertisements in compliance with the
guidelines established by the Supreme
Court. The announcement was published
subsequent to the receipt of the Grievance
Commission's letter.
The next move belongs to the Grievance Commission; but movement and
comment have not been forthcoming.
Stagnation is obviously not tolerated at
LEGUM, COCHRAN & CHARTRAND,
P.A. any more than is intimidation. On
July 28 ad "B" appeared in The Evening
Capital.
The jury is still out on this noteworthy
episode, but the verdict, no matter how
slow in coming, seems certain; lawyer advertising has arrived.

Medicaid
Funds
Aborted
by Janis A. Riker

As a result of two decisions by the
Supreme Court permitting States to
refuse to pay for non therapeutic abortions
with Medicaid funds, A Brooklyn Federal
District Court judge opened the doors for
Congressional action to prohibit Medicaid
payments for all abortions except those
cases where the life of the mother would
be in danger if the pregnancy were carried
to term.
In Beal v. Doe, 97 S.Ct. 236, (June 20,
1977), and Maher v. Roe, 97 S.Ct. 2366,
(June 20, 1977), the Supreme Court held
that neither Title XIX of the Social
Security Act nor the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states partiCipating in the Medicaid
program to spend Medicaid funds for nontherapeutic abortions.
Following these decisions regarding
state action, the Supreme Court ordered
the District Court judge to reconsider his
previous injunction prohibiting enforcement of the Hyde Amendment, which
limits federal Medicaid funds for abortions
to those in which the life of the mother is
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in danger (Department of Labor and
Health, Education and Welfare Appropriation Act, 1977, sec. 209, Pub. L.
No. 94-439 (1976)). As a result the injunction was withdrawn. The Hyde
Amendment remained in effect only until
September 30, 1977, but Congress is
deadlocked in considering a continuation
of its restrictions on abortion funding.
Further Congressional action to limit
federal payments for abortions would be
necessary if Congress wants to prohibit
states from using Medicaid funds. The
Court held in Beal that Pennsylvania's
refusal to provide Medicaid coverage for
non therapeutic abortions is not inconsistent with Title XIX of the Social Security
Act, but that the statute does permit a
state to provide such coverage if it so
desires. The Hyde Amendment prohibited
such coverage, however, for the current
fiscal year.
The 6-3 Beal decision (Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun dissenting) is
based on the Court's interpretation of the
language of the statute itself, the intent of
Congress and the federal agency interpretation of the statute.
Quoting the statute's specific language,
the Court concludes that the act confers
broad discretion upon states to adopt
standards for determining the extent of
medical assistance provided.
Noting that nontherapeutic abortions
were unlawful in most states when Congress passed Title XIX in 1965, Justice
Powell said in the opinion that it was not
likely that it was the intent of Congress to
require states to fund nontherapeutic
abortions.
Furthermore, unless there are compelling indications that the agency interpretation of the statute is erroneous, the Court

will follow its construction, and the
Department of Health, Education and
Welfare concluded that Title XIX permits,
but does not require, funding of nontherapeutic abortions.
In its companion Maher deCision, the
Court held that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Constitution does not require a state partiCipating in Medicaid to
pay for nontherapeutic abortions even
though it pays for childbirth. It is this
holding which provides the basis for
federal legislation restricting abortion
coverage by Medicaid funds.
A regulation of the Connecticut
Welfare Department limiting state
Medicaid benefits for first trimester abortions to those that are "medically necessary" (a term defined to include psychiatric
necessity) was challenged by two indigent
women who were unable to obtain physicians' certificates of medical necessity.
A three-judge District Court panel enjoined the state from requiring a certificate of medical necessity for Medicaidfunded abortions, holding that the Equal
Protection Clause requires a state to fund
nontherapeutic abortions if it generally
provides for funds for medical expenses
related to pregnancy and childbirth.
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding
neither discrimination against a suspect
class nor interference with a fundamental
right protected by the Constitution.
In its "strict scrutiny" analysis, the
Court said that it has never held that financial need alone creates a suspect class
for equal protection purposes.
Most importantly, the Court stated that
the fundamental Constitutional right protected in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) was a woman's freedom to decide
to terminate her pregnancy, not an unqualified right to the abortion itself. Roe
prohibits undue state interference with a
woman's decision to have an abortion, but
it does not impose an affirmative obligation on states to make abortions available.
Justice Brennan in his Maher dissent
argues that the Connecticut statute infringes on the woman's constitutionally
protected right of privacy by placing financial presssures on indigent women to
carry their pregnancies to term. However,
the six-justice majority concluded that
Roe did not limit a state's authority to use

public funds to encourage its own values,
such as favoring childbirth over abortion.
The Court said that the Connecticut
regulation:
" ... places no obstacles-absolute or
otherwise-in the pregnant woman's
path to an abortion. An indigent
woman who desires an abortion
sufferes no disadvantage as a consequence of Connecticut's decision to
fund childbirth; she continues as before
to be dependent on private sources
. . .. The State may have made
childbirth a more attractice alternative,
thereby influencing the woman's decision, but it has imposed no restriction
on access to abortions that was not
already there." 97 S.Ct. 2382-2383.
Connecticut's regulation can be sustained under the "rational basis" test that
applies in the absence of a suspect
classification or the interference with a
fundamental right; i.e. whether the legislative scheme rationally furthers some
legitimate, articulated purpose.
The Court concluded that the Connecticut regulation meets the requirement
that the distinction between childbirth
and non therapeutic abortion is rationally
related to a constitutionally permissable
state purpose. That according to the
Court, is the protection of the potential
life of the fetus by encouraging normal
childbirth.
The Court cited Roe v. Wade as recognizing the state's strong interest existing
throughout the pregnancy, including the
first trimester. The subsidy of costs related to childbirth, which are greater than
the costs of a first trimester abortion, is a
rational means of furthering the state's interest. In Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 475 (1970), the court held that
classifications survive equal protection
challenges when a "reasonable basis" for
the classification is shown, despite a
recognition that laws and regulations
allocating welfare funds involve "the most
basic economic needs of impoverished
human beings .... "
Marshall's dissent in Beal actually is a
challenge to the Court's holding in Maher.
Marshall calls for a new equal protection
analysis, which would weigh three factors:
the importance of the governmental
benefits denied, the character of the class,
and the asserted state interests.

The Court in Maher, however, refuses
to engage in a weighing and balancing of
benefits, class characteristics and strength
of state interests. Rather, the Court stated
that "[wlhen an issue involves policy
choices as sensitive as those implicated by
public funding of non therapeutic abortions, the appropriate forum for their
resolution in a democracy is the legislature." 97 S.Ct. at 2385-2386.

Nixon Loses
Bid To
Control "The
Tapes"
by Charles F. Chester

In Nixon v. Administrator of General
Services, 97 S.Ct. 2777 (1977), the
Supreme Court decided by a vote of 7-2
that it was necessary to prevent a president from concealing information of interest to the public simply because the information would reveal embarrassing yet
truthful facts about him. By sustaining the
constitutionality of the Presidential
Recording and Materials Preservation Act
(PRMPA) 44 U.s.C. §2107, the Court has
taken a positive step in the direction of
curbing the abuse of presidential power.
The PRMPA was the congressional
reaction to an agreement between a
former president, Richard M. Nixon and a
former General Services Administrator,
Arthur F. Sampson. They agreed that
General Services Administration would
possess the infamous "Nixon Tapes", but
that Nixon would retain all property rights
to them. One of these rights was to have
the tapes detroyed at Nixon's will, upon
his death, or by September 1, 1984.
Congress, disturbed by this prospective
and arbitrary power reserved for Nixon,
passed legislation to control custody of 42
million pages of documents and 880 reels
of tape. The PRMPA provides for a
screening process by which materials of a
personal nature would be returned to Nix-

on and those of' historical significance
would be released to the public. The
destruction of a President's materials is
prohibited and specific items necessary
for judicial proceedings are subject to supoena.
Although a president still had the right
of access to his materials, Nixon wished to
retain full control over his presidential
materials.
Nixon sought declaratory and injunctive relief and enforcement of his agreement with the GSA in the District Court
for the District of Columbia. The district
court dismissed his case and the decision
was affirmed by the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia.
In response to Nixon's claim that he
was being unlawfully deprived of constitutionally delegated executive powers,
the Supreme Court decided that Congress
did have the authority to pass legislation
affecting the disposition of presidential
materials. The opinion acknowledged that
Nixon retained the full executive control
to which he was entitled because the
release of any tapes is subject to "any
legally or constitutionally based right of
privilege." In the Court's opinion Congress was not attempting to gain any new
authority or take away any legitimate
presidential powers. The legislative intent
of the PRMPA was held to be the protection of the public's right to know the truth
about Watergate and the restoration of
public confidence in government.
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